A two-day workshop was organized last week under the aegis of Indian Institute of Communicable Diseases on developing “surveillance mechanisms for pathogens with biological warfare potential”. It is encouraging that the medical communities, particularly those in the defence services, are concerned with the looming threat of bio-terrorism. Earlier in March this year a US expert in bio-warfare Dr D A Henderson, Director of the Centre for Civilian Biodefence Studies, was in India . He warned about bio-warfare and social degenerates unleashing bio-terror against the civilized. Whereas the US Administration is conscious of the likelihood of this happening and is bracing itself up, we in India are indifferent, even oblivious the threat.

Biological weapons are cheap to produce. The NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations published in 1996 gives comparative figures of the costs involved. It suggests that whereas the cost (in 1969 figures) of conventional weapons is $2000, nuclear armaments $800, and chemical agents $600, the bargain-basement price of biological weapons is a mere one dollar to cause 50% casualties per square kilometer. The inter se comparison has tilted further over the years to emphasise this point. The logistics requirements also are the least sophisticated. A laboratory that produces pharmaceuticals, with readily available instrumentation and testing facilities, is all that is needed and it is well nigh impossible to discover the existence of such a factory, say in Afghanistan , under the control of Osama bin Laden.

As for delivery system, the organisms only have to be packed in an aerosol can and sprayed around. Perpetrators can escape long before biological weapon agents cause casualties, due to the incubation lag of the agents. They neither have to undertake elaborate planning, nor take on suicide missions

Research is not prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention. It is difficult to differentiate between an offensive and defensive research programme; hence any motivated group can easily advance to development and production stages from basic research.

In the US , research on offensive use is not inhibited. In a recent discussion at an IETE Forum, one of the participants suggested that we too should permit counter-measures and offensive related research if we wish to evolve and work out defensive strategies. There is much force in this argument.

Research on biological agents for offensive purposes would be characterized by activities such as the selection for growth, virulence, and toxin production; improving stability under varying environmental conditions; and selection of strains that might overcome existing means of prophylaxis and treatment. Knowledge about these matters is essential for evolving suitable protective strategies and treatment of diseases. However, intent is often misconstrued. Yet when it comes to US’s own research programmes, these are justified on the basis of the strength of their laws and scrupulous adherence to them by the military and the scientific community.

If a country was to initiate a biological weapons research programme, and was willing to risk worldwide condemnation, there is nothing stopping it to initiate one and reach a fairly high level of competence in development and production capabilities. If even those who have signed the Convention and swear by it cannot be trusted, what to talk of terrorist groups who are beyond the pale of the Convention and civilized behaviour. Talibans and Al Qaeda prove the point. And what if the vile act is perpetrated by a third party and linked on Osama bin Laden? None would be wiser in the prevailing ambience of suspicion and mistrust, when opportunities and motives are aplenty.

Herein lies the rub and the agenda for our intelligence, security and civil defence agencies.